


QUADERNS



n. 274 o 275 o 276 o 277:

architecture as IF transcription



Marcel Duchamp, Note autographe pour "Infirmité"
Association Marcel Duchamp / ADMP, Paris
Photo (C) Centre Pompidou, MNAM-CCI

I_Pròleg/Presentació de l'exploració




II_Sequències

II a _

de 1 a 2 / de 2 a 1: La impressió. (Les architectures entre el color llum i el color matèria)

Col·laborador específic: Frederic Amat

Avals/Projectes/Obres: "Una façana Nua".



II b _

de 2 a 3 / de 3 a 2: La projecció. (Les architectures entre dues dimensions de l'espai euclidià)

Col·laborador específic: Antonio Sanmartín


Avals/Projectes/Obres: "Catedral" de John Hejduk

II c _

de 3 a 4 / de 4 a 3: La memòria-i' experiència. (Les architectures de l'experiència i la memòria)

Col·laborador específic: Benedetta Tagliabue- Guayente García Sanmartín

Avals/Projectes/Obres: FORO ROMANO y MUSEO de la IDENTIDAD ITALIANA.




II d _

de 4 a.../ de...a 4: El transfinit. (Les architectures del gairebé impensable i la potència digital)

Col·laborador específic: José Ignacio Latorre

Avals/Projectes/Obres: "CASCADA" de Yunchul Kim en QUANTICA CCCB.




II f _

de 4 a 0 / de 0 a 4: La intel·ligibilitat. (Les architectures de la predicció)

Col·laborador específic: Miguel Roldán

Avals/Projectes/Obres: La casa de Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein.



II e _

de 0 a 1 / de 1 a 0: La metàfora. (Les architectures del nomenar / pensar, l'arquitectura dins y fora del cinema: Harun Farocki).

Col·laborador específic: Luis Feduchi (+Antonio Sanmartín)

Avals/Projectes/Obres: Übertragung de Harun Farocki



III_

Taxonomies parcials de l'arquitectura de la transcripció de la fragilitat i la semblança avui.



IV_

ANACRONIA de la Revista QUADERNS/ Bibliografia/Referències/links/



de 1 a 2 / 2 a 1 La impressió.

La diferència / equivalència entre l'arquitectura del color-llum i color-matèria és un dels esdeveniments que la resolen. Hi ha transferències algebriques, microscòpiques, de programació, de micro-balística... Escriure / dibuixar és un traç semblant on es troba l'arquitectura.

Frederic Amat enfilàrà la bastida de les transcripcions intentant "escoltar amb els ulls," "bussejar en un món en el qual els fruits d'un arbre no són peres ni pomes sinó llengües," o revelar els objectes no en la seva sola presència, en la seva immediatesa, sinó en el seu ésser místic. La **Façana Nua** serà l'aval per aquest espai de la transcripció.



de 2 a 3 / 3 a 2. La projecció.

L'arquitectura entre dues dimensions de l'espai euclidià, del paper a l'edifici i de l'edifici al paper. Hi ha diversos espais on passa la projecció i tanmateix tota construcció passa per aquets espais. Entre un dibuix amb diagrames per fer un vaixell de paper i el vaixell de paper operen reflexions sobre la projecció de Robin Evans, Scott Cohen, Peter Eisenman, L. Wittgenstein, Philibert de L'Orme, Piero della Francesca, ... El que connecta el pensament a la imaginació, la imaginació al dibuix, el dibuix als edificis (coses), i aquestes amb els nostres ulls són processos de projecció i per tant de geometria.


Antonio Sanmartín presentarà el projecte "**CATEDRAL**" de John Hejduk com aval d'aquesta transcripció.



de 3 a 4 / de 4 a 3: La memòria/l'experiència.

L'experiència fa la memòria de les arquitectures futures. El pensament analògic es mou en l'àmbit de les imatges i utilitza materials del passat, es nodreix de memòries. El viatge, l'errar, prové de veure suspesa la idea d'essència per la irrupció de les coses de la vida. Aquest viatge és interromput perquè la realitat és discontinua: l'ordre de les coses és diferent de l'ordre de les idees. L'autobiografia científica d'Aldo Rossi, el Viatge a l'Interior del Temps de LMM o "La imaginació analògica" de M. Pla descriuen aquest trànsit.

Benedetta Tagliaibue, amb la col·laboració de **Guayente García**, postularan la transcripció de l'intersticial des del punt de vista de la memòria i l'experiència, proporcionant exemples de l'inefable, com el **Fòrum romà** i el **Museu/Reminder de la Identitat Italiana**, que són els avals que verifiquen aquesta transcripció.



de 4 a... / de... a 4. El transfinit.

És l'estat de la qüestió del potencial digital, que és mutant crònic.

José Ignacio Latorre oferirà un passeig per la quàntica no relativista. Explicarà les múltiples capes de intuïcions de l'obra **CASCADA** de Yunchul Kim que s'eleva en una **arquitectura misteriosa**. "El gest de complicitat envers el científic consisteix en passar de l'objectivitat de la mesura a la intel·ligència de l'experimentador. Observar és detindre la mirada. Experimentar és comprendre l'observació"



de ... a 0 / de 0 a ... La intel·ligibilitat

Jeff Hawkins ha demostrat que la invenció no és un processador, sinó que opera mitjançant mecanismes de "predicció" sobre peces i fragments d'allò conegut de l'experiència prèvia organitzats en un amuntegament que va dels detalls als conceptes. **Miguel Roldan**, tornarà a meditar el fet que l'arquitectura és sempre un lloc tot i que els escenaris estiguin en trànsit.

La casa per la germana de **L Wittgenstein**, Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein, és l'aval que desvetlla la arquitectura en aquesta transcripció.



de 0 a 1 / 1 a 0. La metàfora.

Les metàfores són expressions innovadores que són part de la nostra manera de pensar, de caracteritzar el món. Son epistemològicament i comunicativament necessàries. Una definició de C. Cacciari de comprensió no immediata del text "Why do we speak metaphorically" es refereix a un dels quatre mecanismes de la metàfora: Highlighting, Projection, Predicate Re-presentation i Knowledge Restructuring.

Luis Feduchi desenvoluparà aquest tema a partir de les arquitectures del nomenar / pensar, mitjançant l'obra cinematogràfica de Harun Farocki. Exposarà la relació entre les imatges complexes i la construcció d'un pensament per mitjà de lògiques metafòriques.

*En cas de resultar seleccionats, l'equip editorial establirà quin dels 6 apartats és el que aquest es desenvolupa amb major profunditat i extensió.

III. Taxonomies parcials de l'arquitectura de la transcripció de la fragilitat i la semblança avui.

La traça i la inspecció contemporània, la construcció de l'"avui / aquí" que succeeix en aquests sis parèntesis són els vèrtexs especulatius per aquest número de Quaderns on apareixerà una selecció significativa de treballs i arquitectes de l'univers de les transcripcions que exploren el territori de l'infralleu.

La fragilitat és una qualitat neutra d'aquestes realitats en transformació: pot expressar la vulnerabilitat de les coses, però també ser la clau d'una forma delicada de bellesa, la lleugeresa d'aquest propi esdevenir imparable que no aspira a monumentalitzar el seu pas pel món. Fragilitat és la condició d'aquests espais que viuran la plenitud del seu esdevenir en un breu termini temporal. La semblança, quant a mecanisme poètic, governa la successió d'esdeveniments proposats en la producció dels projectes i de l'arquitectura.

Com a conseqüència, part d'aquest nombre de Quaderns, plantejarà una "topologia impossible" que ja ha definit J. M. Torres Nadal: *La reconstrucció estrictament disciplinar o arquitectònica d'aquests paradigmes (les derives ecològiques de l'ordre mental, mediambiental i social) és una tasca gairebé impossible. Però aquest impossible utòpic i lliure és l'espai del projecte contemporani.*

Mariona Benedito, com a col·laboradora, coordinarà un equip d'"exploradors": Miguel Rami, Jaime Feliu, Tirso Otero Salinas, Diego Pérez y Guayente Garcia.

Carrillo elii Smiljan Radic vidler
vynk taillieu Gonzalo del Val Vora Arquitectura Flexo
Arquitectura MAIO Fala Arquitectura Go
Hasegawa Arquitectura - GON design & Partners
LANDLAB Izaskun Chinchilla Paisaje Transversal
Lacol ANDRÉS JAQUE Akihisha Hirata Architecture
Office Life Reusing Posidonia Mateo Ferroni KAAN Fuertes -
Penedo Jun Igarashi SMS arquitectura Domestic Data
Streamers DataAE Adria Escolano David Steegman Carla
Juaçaba barkow leibinger smao GIJON&GUYER
Valor - Llimós amid.cero9 JAAS Maria Mallo Dosa
estudio alvmtr 51N4E aixopluc Arno Brandlhuber
UN studio Takk Architecture Bruther Sergison
Bates M2N Raamwerk Carmody Groarke
Adamo Faiden MORRIS&Co Studio Muoto JPAM
AceboxAlonso P-M-A-A Felice Barini Toni Cumella
Delmulle Delmulle Sergio Sebastian CZ StudioConformi
Enorme Estudio DAVID KOHN Vivas architects JORGE
NIDAL STUDIO Addenda architects Pedro Pitarch

¿Systems or transfers between "dimensions" or "branas"?

a.1. Ensayos de "travesías/secuencias":

de 1 a 2 / de 2 a 1: La Impresión en color: la tecnología del chip para impresoras color de HP, el álgebra(?), la escritura.

de 2 a 3 / de 3 a 2: La proyección / la geometría "significada". Projective Cast de REvans, Contested symetries de PScott Cohen; un cartón que es una caja de vasos ó una pajarita que es un hoja de papel;...

de 3 a 4 / de 4 a 3: La experiencia: Duración/aire/sucesos entre cuerpos. (Autobiografía científica de AR Apuntes de un Viaje al interior del Tiempo LMM.)

de 4 a.../ de...a 4: Descripciones del Infinito (?)

de 4 a 0 / de 0 a 4: Cómo trabaja el CORTEX

de 0 a 1 / de 1 a 0: La metáfora/la analogía: el pensamiento figurativo.

los otros casos: de 0 a 2 / de 2 a 0; de 1 a 3 / de 3 a 1; de 2 a 4 / de 4 a 2;... (¿y las dimensiones intermedias, mandelbrot....??). Una aclaración. (Otras Ilustraciones/ casos de 3a2 y de 1a2 son los ejemplos del libro "Envisioning Information" de E. Tufte.)

a.2. Práctica 1: El espacio de un truco de los que describe Pablo Minguet en "Juegos de Manos. O sea el Arte de hacer Diabluras". Edición facsimil y prólogo de Joan Brossa.

a.3. Ref: "El movimiento" S. Giedeon

Diverse and numerous management, production and invention systems used in architecture are implemented and deployed by all agents, institutions and architects to facilitate, teach or practice it. Is the mediation, transition or transcription between systems what makes the practice and the understanding of possible architectures. ("trasiego" is the spanish word)

"Projection" occurs constantly in architecture and makes it. Not only does projection occupy the gap between dimensions (from 2 to 3 or vice versa is a frequent case), but operates between a diversity of phenomena related to architecture as well. **"Imprinting", "memory-experience", "transfinite", "intelligibility", "metaphor" are also forms of transcription.** Projection is a vehicle to allow the built to travel into the unbuilt as well as to make the later become the former or become something else. This transit happens in a non-uniform and non-isolated field. Geometry supports projection. Projection operates between thinking, imagining, drawing and making things. Our eyes and built things share projection processes. Architecture finds a non originary origin in every transition understood and performed as an intelligible sequence to be described, built, narrated and shared.

"Transit" also operates as a surveying instrument for guiding and tracing the process of projecting emerging architectural thoughts being developed in the contemporary culture. Is there such a thing as a geometric experiment within the visual space?. Is projection able to connect palpable experience and abstract mathematics? "Transit", transition, transgression, transcription,...the meeting in Benasque expects to leave at sight such avatar or apotheosis.

Impression "de 1 a 2 / de 2 a 1": La Impresión en color: la tecnología del chip para impresoras color de HP, el álgebra(¿?), la escritura.

configuration page1

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Printer Name: hp color LaserJet 3500
Printer Number: 2E
Printer Serial Number: CNCR08468
Formatter Number: A6110136568
Firmware Datecode: 20040119 1.000.1
Service ID: 15007
Page Count: 803
Color Page Count: 457

Event Log

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Maximum Number of Entries: 50
Three Most Recent Entries:

Number	Page Count	Entry
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3	383	41.05.00
2	383	13.90.00

Installed Personalities and Options

JR4.0 (20030808)

Calibration Information

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Last DMax/DHalf page count: 770

Memory

Total Memory: 64 MB

Security


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
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
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5	b3	a8	9c	b1	a6	9b	b9	ab	9f	bf	b4	a6	70	70	70	70
6	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
7	e7	00	05	00	04	17	be	06	e2	f1	1a	02	5f	10	62	0d
8	32	37	29	00	80	27	85	29	1a	10	10	00	00	00	00	00
9	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
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14	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
15	64	64	64	64	5c	5c	5c	5c	56	56	56	5a	00	00	00	00
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ENGLISH (1)







These are the famous MacAdam (1942) ellipses; they show the areas in the CIE chromaticity diagram corresponding to 10 times the standard deviation of color matching for one observer.




Each of the MacAdam ellipses was based on a series of matches constrained in defined directions about a color center. In this example, each circle represents the standard deviation of a match from point $x = 0.160$, $y = 0.057$. MacAdam's observer, P. G. Nutting, performed over 20,000 matches in all!



MacAdam ellipses plotted in the CIE 1976 a^*b^* diagram. [From Robertson (1977).]




MacAdam ellipses plotted in the CIE 1976 u^*v^* diagram. [From Robertson (1977).]



When the experiment included changes in luminance factor in addition to chromaticity, ellipsoids result, such as those derived by Brown (1949).

Projection "de 2 a 3 / de 3 a 2": La proyección / la geometría "significada".Projective Cast de REvans, Contested symetries de PScott Cohen; un cartón que es una caja de vasos ó una pajarita que es un hoja de papel;...



- a. Introducción.
- b. de 2a3/3a2: La proyección.
- c. Architecture as/is transcription, resumen del trasiego.
- d. Ilustraciones.
- e. Notas

Así, la serie de "travesías/secuencias/trasiegos" a describir es:

de 1 a 2 / de 2 a 1: **La impresión.**

de 2 a 3 / de 3 a 2: **La proyección.**

de 3 a 4 / de 4 a 3: **La memoria- la experiencia:** Duración/aire/sucesos entre cuerpos.

(Autobiografía científica de AR Apuntes de un Viaje al Interior del Tiempo LMM.)

de 4 a.../ de...a 4: **El transfinito.**

de 4 a 0 / de 0 a 4: **La inteligibilidad.** Cómo trabaja el CORTEX

de 0 a 1 / de 1 a 0: **La metáfora,** la analogía: el pensamiento figurativo.

Hay otros casos posibles: de 0 a 2 / de 2 a 0; de 1 a 3 / de 3 a 1; de 2 a 4 / de 4 a 2;...

(¿y las dimensiones intermedias, o los que se puedan dar entre las Branas descritas por Lisa Randall o Mandelbrot....??).

2.a.2. Práctica/Ensayo 1:

El espacio de un truco de los que describe Pablo Minguet en " *Juegos de Manos. O sea el Arte de hacer Diabluras*". Edición facsimil y prólogo de Joan Brossa.

Este trasiego nutre y hace tangible los contenidos de los cursos de Proyectos de los últimos 10 años. Son las prácticas/experimentos/secuencias/ensayos que se despliegan y materializan. La edición "la cosa para 2s tiempos" incluye un texto que podía incluirse aquí. Otra opción es pasarlo al apartado de "Prácticas/Ensayos" asociados a cada tramo de la tesis

(22Ag10) Cuatro o cinco elementos al cierre del curso académico 2010-11 en ETSAB y en ESARQ:

1. La cancelación de la reunión "Projection. A transit"

2. El texto de E. Trias para la edición "la cosa para 2s tiempos"

3. Los resultados y valoraciones del curso de PfG en la ESARQ. Los pasos arriesgados fueron el "cuerpo del contexto", generado a partir de una variable del contexto, de la redescrípción del lugar con esa variable pero redescrita en Rihno al aplicarle un algoritmo/scripting (Anna Pla aportó una explicación de experta y los pluggs-ins), y replicando esta superficie emergente para obtener el cuerpo del contexto. Quedó una reserva de información de los scriptins que no pudo usarse. La Esarq ofrece un Master para de definición constructiva de superficies complejas pero el esfuerzo extra del curso por pasar por esos asuntos no se recoge en la calificaciones finales

Architecture as/is Transcription

Trasiegos

Cata a lo largo: la proyeccion

pág. 7

del tribunal. Hay que pensar en un nuevo "riesgo" ó en un "ajustar y reordenar la secuencia"

4.Exposición sobre 3Dprinting comisariada por Ramón Prat, Marta Male,... Es el transito de "1 a 3/3 a 1". HP presenta la impresora 3D.

5.Tres ó cuatro libros de interés:


_"The Diagrams of Architecture" . Editado por Mark Garcia, incluye artículos de PE, Samford Kwinter, B. Tschumi, A. Vidler,...


_"Manufacturing material effects". Editado por B. Kolarevic y K. Klinger, incluye artículos y trabajos de Achim Menges, OMA,... sobre la fabricación paramétrica de componentes con dimensiones y cualidades sistemáticamente distintas.


_"El cuadrado", "El triangulo" y "El círculo", tres compilaciones de Bruno Munari de 1960. Son un listado básico de casos de trasiego entre geometría y cosas.


_"Arquitectura Escrita" Editado por Juan Calatrava y Winfred Nerdinger. Es un catalogo en cuya mitad inicial se han compilado textos sobre distintos aspectos y asuntos entre la arquitectura y la literatura. (Seria de 1 a 3/3 a 1). En la segunda mitad aparecen un buen numero de casos históricamente reconocidos de arquitecturas descritas antes de ser arquitecturas o que nunca llegaron a ser arquitecturas pero que han sido trascritas a modelos por los alumnos de Calatrava y Nerdinger:. Es un trabajo reductivo para encontrar la versión "correcta" de la arquitectura o ciudad a la que se refiere el texto: La casa de papel (C. M. Domínguez), La vida, instrucciones de usos (G. Perec), El nombre de la Rosa (U. Eco), Solaris (Stanislaw Lem), La casa (Manuel Múgica Lainez), Heliopolis (E. Junger), 1984 (George Orwell), Pippi Langstrumpf /A. Lindgren), El juego de Abalorios (H. Hesse), La Biblioteca de Babel (J.L. Borges), La casa de Bernarda Alba (F. G. Lorca), Los niños terribles (J. Cocteau), El castillo (F. Kafka), Nosotros (E.I: Zamiatin), Arquitectura de Cristal (P. Sheerbart), Locus Solus (R. Roussel), Los cuadernos de Malte Laurens Bridgge (R. M. Rilke), Al otro lado (Alfred Kubin, Trabajo/La ciudad Industrial (E. Zola, T. Garnier), Noticias de Ninguna Parte (W. Morris), Drácula (B. Stoker), Effi Briest (Th. Fontane), La isla de Helice (J. Verne), A contrapelo (J. K. Huysmans), Los 500 millones de la Begum (J. Verne), tiempos difíciles (Ch. Dickens), Vida de Henry Brulard Stendhal), El Tío Goriot (H. De Balzac), El cottage de Landor (E. A. Poe), Los años de peregrinaje de Wilhelm Meister (J. W. Goethe), El castillo de Otranto (Horace Walpole), Los viajes de Gulliver (J. Swift), El paraíso Perdido (J. Milton), EL diablo Cojuelo (L. Vélez de G.), Castillo interior ó Las Moradas (Sta. Teresa de Jesús), La muy horrible vida del gran Gargantúa (F. Rabelais), La ciudad del Sol (T. Campanella), Mundo sabio y Loco (A. F. Doni), Utopia (T. Moro), Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (F. Colonna), Amadis Gaula, Laurnetinum (Plinio de Joven), Timeo/Critias (Platón), Lugares de cuentos, Lugares de leyendas y mitos, Lugares de la Biblia. Falta referencia a Italo Calvino/JH en la ciudades invisibles ó Romeo y Julieta/PE, a Terragni con el Danteum,...


Se lee en la introducción de Juan Calatrava: "El estudio multidisciplinar de los contactos, coincidencias, paralelismos, encuentros, intersecciones ó cruces entre edificios y obras literarias, entre escritura y construcción, entre arquitectos y escritores, constituye sin duda un laboratorio privilegiado a la hora de comprobar lo intelectualmente fructífera que puede ser la yuxtaposición de saberes o

















FIG. 3



Fig.
LXIV.






Fig. LXX.

Architecture as/is Transcription

Trasiegos

Cata a lo largo: la proyeccion

pág. 49




Fig. LII.

Architecture as/is Transcription

Trasiegos

Cata a lo largo: la proyeccion

pág. 50




Fig. XXXI.




Fig. XXXII.




Fig. XXXIV.



Fig. XII.




Fig. XIII.




Fig. XIV.




Fig. XV. a



Fig. XII.




Fig. XIII.




Fig. XIV.





Fig. XV. a

trate the point with another example: suppose I project the length A on the line below



and claim that I could also have projected it on $b-b$. Someone objects that I cannot do this in the same way. But what is the same way? He has left a loophole in his *expression*. If my description of the projection did not describe the whole figure, i.e., if the way in which I projected A did not reach to the projected line, then I should have the line projected, the projection, and the *way* of projection. If, on the other hand, in the word “way” I assumed the whole figure, then it could not with sense be said that I could not have projected it on $b-b$ in the same way. The phrase “the way” has to apply to both in order for it to make sense to say that here this way could not be taken.

The Seeing Subject and Visual Space.

It is nonsense to say “I see this object¹ in visual space”. As opposed to what? Is it conceivable that I hear it, or that someone else sees it?²

Therefore neither can I say that the object within my visual space is the cause of my seeing it.

(Therefore it is also nonsense to say: From a primordial cloud there developed the suns, the planets, the most primitive living things, and finally a being that is organized in such a way that it can see all of these things and can contemplate them. Unless by “contemplate” one understands purely physical utterances in the sense of Ichthyophonie. In this sense one can also say of a camera that it perceives something.)

If one were asked: What is the difference between a sound and a colour? One might answer: “We hear sounds, but we see colours”, then this is only a hypothesis that is justified through experience, if saying this makes any sense in the first place. And to that extent it is conceivable that one day I shall perceive sounds with my eyes, i.e. see them, and shall hear colours. What is essential to sounds and colours is obviously shown in the grammar of the words for sounds and colours.

When we speak about visual space we are easily seduced into imagining that it is a kind of peep-show box that everyone carries around in front of³ himself. That is to say, in doing this we are using the word “space” in a way similar to when we call a room a space. But in reality the word “visual space” only refers to a geometry, I mean to a section of the grammar of our language.

In this sense there are no “visual spaces” each of which, say, would have its own owner. (And are there maybe also such visual spaces that are itinerant, that don’t belong to anyone at the moment?)

“But can’t I see a landscape in my visual space and you a room in yours?” – No – “I see in my visual space” is nonsense. It must be “I see a landscape and you, etc.” – and that isn’t being called into question. What is misleading us here is simply the simile of the peep-show or, say, of a circular white disc that we carry with us as a projection screen, as it were, which is the space where the respective visual image appears. But the flaw in this simile is that it visually imagines the opportunity – the possibility – of a visual image itself appearing; for, after all, the white screen is itself an image.

1 (V): see the things

2 (V): hear them, or that someone else sees them?

3 (V): carries along with

aval(*)

(sXXI_) Casa da Musica. Oporto. OMA
Datos básicos:


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
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
Asistente edición:
Eduardo Carles Tolrá, arquitecto ESARQ.


Crónica/Descripción/Memoria .

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klSJADH lkjq d q paoieuh qoiuewh qoweir [q werj [owiejr pppweiorjqpj
q[wperj q[pejr q[wpeojrpwowej pieej o9e eoeoeoq pqpwe0239yh4toifejfjfpj
qwer0pwerpqojk kepqwoe pqwoe pwoerj i ko o o opppp 00ir m -- -03 - 0-0-0ir-02i3r
-03r -pqr qr -q0ri -q0iirjf;adflksjmfna,l alifj foid ...










"Trasiegos" entre sistemas: Arquitecturas
De 2 a 3 / 3 a 2 la proyección.

S. XXI 2001-2005
Rem Koolhaas
Casa da Música,
Porto, Portugal
1/100



aval (**)

(sXX_) House L even ODD. Peter Eisenman.
Datos básicos:


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Descripción:
Planos a e/10000, 1/1000, e1/100, e1/10, e1/1.


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Eduardo Carles Tolrá, arquitecto ESARQ-UIC


Crónica/Descripción/Memoria.

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fhpqoiwehqpowe p8oqwehfhfgowe qpowepq 3e ` 9we`9we90q2r8c mnsc ash wwue
klSJADH lkjq d q paoieuh qoiuewh qoweir [q werj [owiejr pppweiorjqpj
q[wperj q[pejr q[wpeojrpwowej pieej o9e eoeeoq pqpwe0239yh4toifejfjfpj
qwer0pwerpqojk kepqwoe pqwoe pwoerj i ko o o opppp 00ir m -- -03 - 0-0-0ir-02i3r
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
Trasiegos






"Trasiegos" entre sistemas: Arquitecturas
 De 1 a 2 / 2 a 1 LA INMISION

S.XX 1980-
 Peter Eisenman
 House I, 2788 Old,
 California, Usa
1/500



"Trasiegos" entre sistemas: Arquitecturas
De 2 a 3 / 3 a 2 1a Proyección

S.XX 1980-
Peter Eisenman
House L Even Odd,
California, Usa
1/200



"Trasiegos" entre sistemas: Arquitecturas
DE 2 a 3 / 3 a 2 La Proyección

S.XX 1980-
Peter Eisenman
House 1 Even ODD,
California, Usa

1/10



aval (****)

(before s_XVII).Chateau d'Anet, Philibert de l'Orne . Anet. France.

Datos básicos:

Refs./Bibliografia/www/archivos:

Descripción:


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Asistente edición:

Eduardo Carles Tolrá, arquitecto ESARQ-UIC

Crónica/Descripción/Memoria.

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fhpgoiwehqpweh p8oqwehfhfqowe qpowepq 3e ` 9we`9we90q2r8c mnsch ash wwue
klSJADH lkjq d q paoieuh qoiuewh qoweir [q werj [owiejr pppweiorjqpj
q[wperj q[pejr q[wpeojrpowejr pieej o9e eoeeoq pqpwe0239yh4toifejfj fopj
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



Trasiegos



Tesina Fin de Master 2011

pág. 17









"Trasiegos" entre sistemas: Arquitecturas
De 2 a 3 / 3 a 2 la Proyección

before S. XVII 1550-1555
Philibert de l'Orme
Château d'Anet,
Place du Château, Anet, Francia

1/10




Memory and Exxperience “de 3 a 4 / de 4 a 3”: La experiencia: Duración/aire/sucesos entre cuerpos. (Autobiografía científica de AR Apuntes de un Viaje al Interior del Tiempo LMM.)

OPPOSITIONS BOOKS

Postscript by Vincent Scully
Translation by Lawrence Venuti

Aldo Rossi

A Scientific Autobiography



ROSTH






Transfinite

"de 4 a.../ de...a 4": Descripciones del Infinito.


Learning to see DATA,. Benedict Carey NY Times Sunday
29March2015.


"It's about patterns of recognition; how you choose to
look, rather than what yo're trying to see. Scientists
often think of visual images like graphs as the end
result of their analysis. (Daniel Khon, painter).



Intellegibility de ...a 0 / de 0 a ...: Cómo trabaja el CORTEX

(a)





metaphore

de 0 a 1 / de 1 a 0" : Mecanismos de la metáfora De acontecimiento de lenguaje a estructura del conocimiento.




Figura 7.2 Schema che mostra il ruolo delle strutture di proiezione.

metaphore

de 1 a 4 / de 4 a 1" : between non consecutive dimensions.

(a) TRACTATUS – a house – INVESTIGATIONS

- 3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
- 3.02 A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too.
- 3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.
- 3.031 It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic.—The truth is that we could not *say* what an 'illogical' world would look like.
- 3.032 It is as impossible to represent in language anything that 'contradicts logic' as it is in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist.
- 3.0321 Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can be represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of geometry cannot.
- 3.04 If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth.
- 3.05 A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it with).
- 3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.
- 3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.
The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.
- 3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign.—And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.
- 3.13 A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected.
Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is.
A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it.
(‘The content of a proposition’ means the content of a proposition that has sense.)

Figure 1. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).

125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs *before* the contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.)

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).

It throws light on our concept of *meaning* something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't mean it like that."

The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.

126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions.

127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.

128. If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.

129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

130. Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language—as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as *objects of comparison* which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.

Figure 2. *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

Spatial Practices from Architecture to Philosophy

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm.—LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, *Philosophical Investigations*, sec. 118

What if the field in which architecture and philosophy operate is inclusive of linguistic and spacial practices?

To begin a project concerned with the relationship between Ludwig Wittgenstein's practices of architecture and philosophy is to enter a territory whose fundamental principles of operation are in question. Overflowing with possibilities latent in relations between linguistic practices and spatial ones, the territory in question is ripe. Its operations, however, have been mired in the entrenched presupposition that a gap exists between the linguistic and the spatial, between language and the world. But what if no gap exists? What if the field in which architecture and philosophy operate is inclusive of linguistic and spatial practices? What potentials stem from understanding the relations between language and not-language as constituting aspects of a shared territory of meaningful practice? This sense that language operates within a fluid territory of practice with the world it represents is the underlying premise of this book, a premise that culminates in the conclusion that Wittgenstein's practice of architecture contributed a central and active component to his philosophical development.

While Wittgenstein's practice of architecture lies outside the margins of most discussions of his philosophy, *Wittgenstein's House: Language, Space, &*

...discerning the influence of Wittgenstein's practice of architecture on the subsequent philosophy of language.

Transgressions

The current of this book lies in discerning the influence of Wittgenstein's practice of architecture on his subsequent philosophy of language. Toward this end, the approach is in many ways from the point of view of the practice of architecture and the late philosophy of the *Investigations*. In this scenario, Wittgenstein's early philosophy of the *Tractatus*, as the site of his pre-practice of architecture, serves as a form of datum or measure of comparison by which to gauge the impact of architecture's influence. That measure comes in large part from an examination of the spatial epistemologies or problematics underlying each phase of Wittgenstein's philosophical output. Attending to these fundamental spatial constructs in the philosophy opens up new aspects of similar concepts instituted in both the early and late work and becomes useful in establishing grounds that transpire between the architecture and philosophy. The fundamental conception of space that this examination identifies within the *Tractatus* is what I characterize as the view from above or without and whose operative construct I propose to be that of transgression.

THE VIEW FROM ABOVE

Central to the *Tractatus*'s development of its thought, philosophy, and textual production is an interrelated set of spatial and visual concerns. These range from its construction of the view from above, by which it depicts language, to its reliance on the spatial acts of positioning to define the limits of sensible thought, its division between showing and saying, and

- I The world is everything that is the case.*
- I.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- I.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being *all* the facts.
- I.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.
- I.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
- I.2 The world divides into facts.
- I.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same.
- 2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
- 2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
- 2.011 It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact.
- 2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing *can* occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing.
- 2.0121 It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
 If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.
 (A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.)

* The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions *n.1*, *n.2*, *n.3*, etc., are comments on proposition No. *n*; the propositions *n.m1*, *n.m2*, etc., are comments on the proposition No. *n.m*; and so on.

ultimately its diagnosis of linguistic and surface confusion as the underlying basis of philosophical problems—problems the *Tractatus* hopes to rectify by instituting the view from above.

Underlying these complex spatial constructs are the interrelated and explicitly spatial concepts of limit, boundary, and transgression that the *Tractatus* relies upon to accomplish its philosophical work. The concepts involved not only refer to some understanding of spatiality, however, *but are themselves inconceivable without committing to certain conceptions of space* that embed spatiality into the very core of the *Tractatus*, making it necessary to approach the text itself as a spatial construct integral to grasping its own philosophy. This is to say that the *Tractatus*, *in attempting to define the limits of the thinkable, is itself unthinkable outside the severely restricted understanding of space it produces, a space determined by the view from above.*

The philosophy that results from this view differentiates itself by striving to produce a completely clarified view of language from which a completely clarified form of expression may become apparent. Outlined in the preface to the *Tractatus* is the philosophy's fundamental goal of defining the limits of sensible language:

the aim of this book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e., we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.

Envisioning that limit becomes the work of the *Tractatus*, work that of necessity *crosses its standard limits by transgressing the limits of language* in order to envision them as the view from above language. It is in this paradoxical and circular process that the view from above and the operation of transgression become entangled as inseparable partners of an impossible dialectic.

As its operative principle, transgression sets the construction of the view from above into motion through an acknowledged transgression of the limits of sensible thought, moving the *Tractatus* beyond what it admits of language. Transgression in the *Tractatus* is thus both product and productive: while it serves as the central operation that the *Tractatus* executes to institute the view from above, it is a direct product of the extremely limited and limiting activity of philosophy in the *Tractatus*, limitations that extend into the view itself.

The *Tractatus's* understanding of language and philosophy depends upon positioning the viewer of language above language, looking downward. The formation of the view from above is evinced with the *Tractatus's* derivation of a series of spatial limits dispersed throughout the text. The *Tractatus* repeatedly details language, logic, the subject, and the world in terms of these limits. The series begins with the text's opening lines and its suggestion of the world as a limiting factor of knowledge and continues on to reinforce that limit by making it coextensive with the limits of logic, of the self, of the sayable, and ultimately of silence. The view from above comes about in the attempt to locate the point at which the viewing subject becomes capable of seeing these limits.

- I The world is all that is the case.
- 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
- 5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, "The world has this in it, and this, but not that."

For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

- 5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world. . . .

What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

While the *Tractatus* presents these limits as absolute statements about the world, they are definitive less of the world or language in total than of a specific, idealized, and limited viewpoint from which the limits of language are presented. The equating or aligning of the limits of language, logic, and the subject (while not differentiating their functionings) is reiterative of the structure of logic—not solely because it is privileged but because its privilege resides in its definitively demarcating language itself. Yet the continued reassociations between logic, the world, and the subject in their interworkings cannot help but expand that limit—against the *Tractatus's* protestations. In connecting the limits of language to the limits of the subject, the *Tractatus* necessarily introduces the viewing subject to

7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence...













general form of propositions by considering the multiplicity of practices that are involved in language, understanding the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House as the compilation and interpenetration of a series of practices allows architecture not to be synonymous with its object, the house. As such, the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House is no longer an object in comparison to philosophy, but a process that as with the philosophy of the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, is concerned with a series of topics, including boundaries, limits, visibility, spatiality, inner-outer relationships, rule-following, meaning, representation, and so on. This view does not force Wittgenstein's work to be viewed as a continuum or as a series of shifts and phases, but permits both continuity and disjunctions. Not uncoincidentally, this shift in method and practice is also a way of understanding the move from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, from the applied method of logical analysis in the *Tractatus* to the investigation and description of the multitude of practices that comprise language in the *Investigations*.

The Practice of Architecture

The Stonborough-Wittgenstein House is perhaps most associated with its austere exterior image, an image taken to reflect the seemingly similar image of austerity and precision of the writing of the *Tractatus* (fig. 3). Both of these images define the view from without. I want to contrast that image with one from the interior, with the view from within, the scene of inhabitation. There, beginning with entry into the central hall of the house, the visitor is presented with a scene of quiet conflict where the idealized pictorial view dreamed of by the *Tractatus* fully encounters the spatial practices of architecture subsequently developed in the *Investigations*.

To enter the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House, the visitor passes through the front glass doors into a small vestibule with light walls and dark floor, through another set of glass doors, up the dark stone stairs, and into the brightly lit space of the central hall. The dark stairs recessed into the center of this space are framed at their end by two white columns. To the left, a glass wall and doors admit light into the hall and passage out to a terrace. To the right, a solid wall harbors a set of paired metal doors (fig. 8).

The central hall is luminous, defined by a series of eight paired glass-and-steel doors on six different surfaces, set into both solid wall and glass plane and leading into the house from the main entry, out to the southwest terrace, and to the dining room, breakfast room, library, and the staircase and upper floors beyond (fig. 9). To the right, the metal doors lead to the

Through the entwining of meaning with practice, as in the multiple and inseparable uses of a word and in the image of the fibers of the thread itself, family resemblance produces an image in sharp contrast to the *Tractatus's* hierarchical and discrete depiction of language and philosophical thought as a ladder. The *Tractatus's* language, in being separate from the world it depicts, leaves the early philosophy in search of a hook to connect language to the world, and the hook it developed was an ineffable logic—a logic at odds with the visible surface of language explored in the *Investigations*. The connectivity attributed to and required of logic in the *Tractatus* becomes transformed in the *Investigations* as the entangled spatio-visual practice of family resemblance. Throughout the *Investigations*, family resemblance emerges in discussions of the practices of reading, calculating, rule-following, agreement, boundaries, and the image of entanglement itself. In a particularly telling example, the concept of family resemblance is employed to unite the meaning of one word with another, as in the interwoven practices of “agreement” and “rule” that rather than directly correspond, are described by Wittgenstein in familial terms as “cousins”:








224. The word “agreement” and the word “rule” are *related* to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.

225. The use of the word “rule” and the use of the word “same” are interwoven. (As are the use of “proposition” and the use of “true.”)

Beginning with the example of “games” and quickly becoming an example for all of language, the construct of family resemblance spreads throughout the text to produce a wide-ranging series of examples. As such, the example of family resemblance remains the most precisely defined yet far-reaching of the images of entanglement Wittgenstein produces. Whereas other images of entanglement arise within specific discussions, family resemblance quickly becomes the guiding principle for the reexamination and reimagining of language itself.

Family resemblance proves more than descriptive; it is generative as well. Examples of images of entanglement emanating from family resemblance proliferate throughout the text as if to act out in various ways family resemblance’s practices of associating, interweaving, overlapping, appearing, disappearing, and reappearing that are first presented in the observing of games. The resulting spatiovisual constructs bring forth the specifics of

these interactions, the delicacy of connections, and the attempt to capture these potentially fleeting images. Additionally, Wittgenstein offers a number of possibilities for producing such images: the landscape sketches, the frames for viewing them, the labyrinth of paths, the mechanisms for collecting and assembling reminders, and the construction of an album in which to record these events and provide a basis for further observation. The final challenge presented for images of entanglement is to navigate the newly constructed notion of boundary and boundary practices they help to introduce, and with that, the shared territory in which they reside—that is, sites in which to survey and incorporate their own spatial territory.



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






...III.6 an invitation to trust and have no fear from and for
Architecture... (as/if transcription)...

Antonio Sanmartin, azCON architectures SLP-aSZ architectes-azCON Kocher MINDER architekten



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